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OPINION 
__________________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Robert Paladino appeals the District Court’s judgment 
revoking supervised release and imposing a sentence of 
imprisonment.  Because Paladino was denied the right of 
allocution at sentencing, we vacate and remand to the District 
Court for resentencing. 
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I. 
 In June 2004, Appellant Robert Paladino responded to 
an internet advertisement placed by an undercover federal 
agent that offered videotapes of young boys engaged in 
graphic and explicit sexual conduct.  Following a number of 
e-mail conversations, Paladino agreed to provide the 
undercover agent with videos of minor age boys engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct in exchange for those offered by the 
undercover agent.    Later that month, after Paladino picked 
up the package delivered by the undercover agent, law 
enforcement tried to arrest Paladino, but he resisted arrest and 
fled.  After a reckless and dramatic car chase, during which 
Paladino struck several cars and discarded the package 
containing the videos, Paladino was apprehended.  Law 
enforcement then executed a search warrant at Paladino’s 
residence, and recovered videotapes, compact discs, and a 
laptop computer.  A search of the laptop computer revealed 
that it contained 5,201 files with images of child 
pornography. 
 
 On November 21, 2006, Paladino pled guilty to one 
count of distributing material depicting the sexual 
exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(a)(1).  In his plea agreement, Paladino also agreed to 
waive his “right to take a direct appeal from his conviction or 
sentence.”  United States v. Paladino, 286 F. App’x 803, 803 
(3d Cir. 2008).   
 On April 20, 2007, the District Court sentenced 
Paladino to one hundred twenty months’ imprisonment, to be 
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followed by a ten-year term of supervised release, and a 
special assessment in the amount of one hundred dollars.1  
 Paladino filed a direct appeal.  On August 15, 2008, 
this Court affirmed Paladino’s sentence because “Paladino 
waived his right to appeal his sentence in his plea agreement” 
and none of the exceptions to that waiver were applicable.  Id.   
 On April 24, 2013, Paladino was released from 
custody and the Probation Office for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania began supervising him.   
 Between July and August 2013, Paladino’s probation 
officer filed two petitions reporting that Paladino had violated 
three supervised release conditions—namely the “condition 
                                              
1 At that time, the District Court also imposed conditions of 
Paladino’s supervised release, including that Paladino not 
“possess any materials, including pictures, photographs, 
books, writings, drawings, videos or video games depicting 
and/or describing child pornography as defined by 18 U.S.C. 
Section [] 2256(8).”  (App. 104.)  In October 2012, Paladino 
agreed to a modification of certain supervised release 
conditions, including a modification stating that the 
“defendant shall not possess or access with intent to view any 
materials, including pictures, photographs, books, writings, 
drawings, videos, or video games depicting and/or describing 
child pornography as defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8), or 
obscene visual representations of the sexual abuse of children 
as defined at 18 U.S.C. §1466A.”  (App. 113.) 
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obligating Defendant not to associate with persons convicted 
of a felony,” the “condition obligating Defendant to abide by 
all provisions of the Computer Restriction and Monitoring 
Program,” and the “condition obligating the Defendant to 
participate in a mental health treatment program and/or sex 
offender treatment program as directed by his probation 
officer.”2   
 On August 12, 2013, at Paladino’s revocation hearing, 
the District Court first asked defense counsel if Paladino 
contested any of the violations alleged in the probation 
officer’s petitions.  In response, Paladino’s counsel stated that 
Paladino challenged the missed treatment violation, as “Mr. 
Paladino indicates [that] it’s a misunderstanding,” and, at 
another point in time, defense counsel stated that another 
“thing we don’t agree on is whether this Defendant can self-
report as he has requested . . . for a day or so.”  (App. 121-
22.)  The record reflects that there was no further discussion 
of Paladino’s challenge to the missed treatment violation or to 
                                              
2 Specifically, the petitions argued that Paladino violated 
those three conditions because Paladino had been “discharged 
from [the Veterans Administration Domiciliary Program] due 
to accessing what they believed to be child pornography,”  
“admitted to viewing boys in their underwear” on “the 
computers at the Carnegie Library,” “admitted . . . to 
contact[ing] felons that are incarcerated in various 
correctional institutions,” had been deceptive during a 
polygraph examination when asked if he had engaged in 
inappropriate sexual conduct, and “failed to show up or 
cancel” a treatment appointment on June 24, 2013.  (App. 
116, 118.) 
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his self-reporting request.  Ultimately, the District Court 
denied the self-reporting request. 
 The District Court also asked whether the parties had 
“reached a joint recommendation as to the new sentence to be 
imposed.”  (Id.)  The Government and defense counsel 
indicated their agreement to “a period of imprisonment of 
eight months to be followed by the continued supervision of 
the ten years.”  (Id.)  The District Court then asked “Mr. 
Paladino, is that your understanding?” and Paladino 
responded “Yes.”  (Id. at 122.)  The record reflects that this 
was the only point at which the District Court personally 
addressed Paladino at the revocation hearing. 
 At the end of the revocation hearing, the District Court 
sentenced Paladino to eight months’ imprisonment to be 
followed by a term of supervised release of one hundred 
sixteen months, which is ten years of supervised release 
“minus the amount of time [Paladino] has already spent on 
supervised release.”  (Id. at 122-23.)  In addition, the District 
Court imposed the original and modified “conditions that 
were part of [Paladino’s] supervised release” for the child 
pornography conviction.  (Id. at 123.)  Paladino’s counsel 
made no objection to the supervised release conditions that 
the District Court imposed. 
 Paladino now appeals, and in so doing, makes two 
arguments.  First, Paladino argues that the District Court 
committed plain error by failing to “address the defendant 
personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present 
any information to mitigate the sentence,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32(i)(4)(A)(ii), and therefore we should vacate and remand 
for resentencing.   
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 Second, Paladino challenges the supervised release 
condition, imposed at his revocation hearing, which required 
Paladino to “not possess or access with intent to view any 
materials, including pictures, photographs, books, writings, 
drawings, videos or video games depicting and/or describing 
child pornography as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8), or 
obscene visual representation of the sexual abuse of children 
as defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1466A.”  (App. 113.)  Specifically, 
Paladino argues that this condition of supervised release is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, and was imposed 
without any justification. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 Given Paladino’s failure to preserve his two objections 
by raising them at the revocation hearing, we review his 
objections for plain error.  Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 
129, 135 (2009) (unpreserved errors are reviewable for plain 
error, pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure); United States v. Plotts, 359 F.3d 247, 248-49 (3d 
Cir. 2004); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).   
III. 
 Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure requires that, “[b]efore imposing sentence, the 
court must . . . address the defendant personally in order to 
permit the defendant to speak or present any information to 
mitigate the sentence.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii).  
Though codified in the twentieth century, the “design of [this 
rule] did not begin with its promulgation; its legal provenance 
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was the common-law right of allocution,” which was 
recognized “[a]s early as 1689.”  Green v. United States, 365 
U.S. 301, 304 (1961).  While “major changes . . . have 
evolved in criminal procedure” since the seventeenth century 
and additional rights have been accorded to defendants since 
that time, “[n]one of these modern innovations lessens the 
need for the defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to 
present to the court his plea in mitigation,” for the “most 
persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant 
as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for 
himself.”  Id. 
 In United States v. Adams, this Court recounted the 
historical and contemporary significance of the right of 
allocution and established that, at a sentencing hearing, a 
district court’s denial of the right of allocution will generally 
result in resentencing under plain error review.  252 F.3d 276, 
289 (3d Cir. 2001).  Three years later, in United States v. 
Plotts, this Court pronounced that “a defendant’s right of 
allocution extends to revocation hearings.”  359 F.3d 247, 
250 (3d Cir. 2004).3 
 “For reversible plain error to exist, there must be (1) an 
error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and 
(4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Tai, 750 
                                              
3 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were subsequently 
amended to expressly provide allocution rights at revocation 
hearings.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(E) (providing that 
defendants at revocation hearings are entitled to “an 
opportunity to make a statement and present any information 
in mitigation”).  
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F.3d 309, 313-14 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)). 
 In Adams and Plotts, this Court concluded that the 
district court committed “error” by failing to address the 
defendant personally prior to sentencing.  Adams, 252 F.3d at 
286; Plotts, 359 F.3d at 250-51.  We also concluded that the 
error was “plain” because it was “clear or obvious.”  Adams, 
252 F.3d at 286 (“[W]hen [the District Court] failed to 
personally address Adams prior to sentencing[] . . . . [despite 
the] clear duty to do so, this error was ‘plain,’ because it was 
‘clear’ or ‘obvious.’” (citations omitted)); Plotts, 359 F.3d at 
251 (finding that the district court’s error was “clear and 
obvious” where “the weight of appellate authority” indicated 
that violation of the allocution right constitutes plain error); 
see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 737.   
 With respect to the third element in the plain error 
review analysis— which asks whether the error “affects 
substantial rights,” or put another way, was prejudicial—this 
Court indicated that, in the context of violations of the right 
of allocution, “as a general matter . . . prejudice should be 
presumed whenever the opportunity exists for this violation to 
have played a role in the district court’s sentencing decision.”  
Adams, 252 F.3d at 289 (emphasis added).4  Lastly, “[i]n 
Adams, we stated without qualification that denial of the right 
                                              
4 We made this pronouncement because, inter alia, any other 
rule, such as one requiring the defendant to “point to 
statements that he would have made at sentencing, and 
somehow show that these statements would have changed the 
sentence imposed by the District Court,” would place “an 
onerous burden” on the defendant.  Adams, 252 F.3d at 287. 
10 
 
of allocution affects the ‘fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings,’” Plotts, 359 F.3d at 250 
n.6 (quoting Adams, 252 F.3d at 288), such that the fourth, 
discretionary element in the plain error analysis is satisfied 
where a violation of the right of allocution has been 
established.  
* * * * * * * * * 
 Against this backdrop, we assess Paladino’s argument 
that, as in Plotts, the District Court here committed plain error 
at his revocation hearing by “failing to offer Mr. Paladino the 
chance to speak on his own behalf” and “den[ying] him the 
opportunity to influence his term of imprisonment, his term of 
supervised release, or his conditions of supervised release.”  
See, e.g., Appellant Br. 13.  We agree. 
 While the record reflects that the District Court did 
address Paladino once—to ask whether Paladino understood 
that he and the Government agreed to an eight-month term of 
imprisonment—the parties do not dispute that the District 
Court did not address Paladino at any other time during the 
revocation hearing.  See, e.g., Appellee Br. 11 (stating that 
“[i]n the present matter the trial court asked Paladino whether 
the terms of the agreement he had reached with the 
government had been accurately stated on the record” and 
that the “court did not invite Paladino to make any additional 
statements”); Appellant Br. 14 (“At Mr. Paladino’s revocation 
hearing, the court never allowed Mr. Paladino the opportunity 
to make a statement or present any information in 
mitigation.”).    
 As the Supreme Court has previously indicated, 
however, district courts must “unambiguously address 
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themselves to the defendant” and “leave no room for doubt 
that the defendant has been issued a personal invitation to 
speak prior to sentencing.”  Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 
301, 305 (1961); see also Adams, 252 F.3d at 279-80 (right of 
allocution violated when district court asked defense counsel, 
but not defendant himself, whether defendant wished to 
exercise his right of allocution). 
 Therefore, we find that the District Court here 
committed an “error” and that error was “plain” because “the 
weight of appellate authority”—including our 
pronouncements in Plotts and Adams about the importance of 
the right of allocution and the resentencing remedy that may 
result from establishing a violation of that right—“is 
sufficient to render the District Court’s error clear and 
obvious.”  Plotts, 359 F.3d at 250-51; see also Adams, 252 
F.3d at 286.   
 Second, “we . . . conclude that prejudice to ‘substantial 
rights’ may be presumed in this case because allocution could 
have played a role in the [District] Court’s sentencing 
decision.”  Plotts, 359 F.3d at 251 (citing Adams, 252 F.3d at 
287).  Specifically, as in Plotts, federal statutory law did not 
require the District Court here to impose any minimum term 
of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (permitting imprisonment for “all or 
part” of the term of defendant’s supervised release); id. § 
3583(h); Plotts, 359 F.3d at 251.  Furthermore, as Paladino 
argues, the District Court imposed upon him a sentence of 
eight months, which is in the middle of the Guidelines range 
of five to eleven months.  See, e.g., Appellant Reply Br. 1-6.  
Thus, had Paladino been afforded the opportunity to “speak 
or present any information to mitigate the sentence,” Fed. R. 
Crim. P. Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii), Paladino’s statements may have 
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prompted the District Court to exercise its discretion, in 
accordance with federal law, to impose a lesser sentence or, 
indeed, no term of imprisonment at all.  See, e.g., Adams, 252 
F.3d at 287 (finding that, because defendant “was sentenced 
roughly in the middle of the applicable Guidelines range . . . 
the District Court clearly retained discretion to grant Adams a 
lower sentence”). 
 Appellee argues that the presumption of prejudice 
applied in Plotts and Adams does not apply here because the 
parties essentially entered into a plea agreement pursuant to 
Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
that was binding on the District Court, such that any 
allocution on the part of Paladino could not possibly have 
affected the sentence.  See Appellee Br. at 13-15.  This 
argument must fail.  Even assuming that the oral plea 
agreement here implicated Rule 11(c)(1)(C) in particular—a 
proposition for which we find no support in the record—a 
district court still retains discretion to accept or reject such an 
agreement.  See, e.g., Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2685, 2692 (2011) (“Rule 11(c)(1)(C) permits the defendant 
and the prosecutor to agree on a specific sentence, but that 
agreement does not discharge the district court’s independent 
obligation to exercise its discretion.”).  Thus, any argument 
that Paladino’s statements could have no impact on the 
District Court—because its hands were essentially tied and 
there were no decisions left for it to make—must fail.5   
                                              
5 Contrary to the Government’s assertions, the agreed-upon 
term of imprisonment is not the only relevant matter upon 
which a defendant might speak.  As we indicated in Adams, 
allocution may play a role in a district court’s sentencing 
decision “whenever a searching review of the district court 
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 Having found that the first three conditions of the plain 
error analysis are met, we also find that “denial of the right of 
allocution is not the sort of ‘isolated’ or ‘abstract’ error that 
we might determine does not impact the ‘fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”  Plotts, 359 F.3d 
                                                                                                     
record reveals that there are any disputed facts at issue at 
sentencing, or any arguments raised in connection with 
sentencing, that if resolved in the defendant’s favor would 
have reduced the applicable Guidelines range or the 
defendant’s ultimate sentence.”  Adams, 252 F.3d at 287; id. 
(indicating that, even when a defendant is sentenced at the 
bottom of the Guidelines range, this Court can still find that 
the opportunity existed for a different sentencing outcome). 
 The record reflects that, at the very least, Paladino’s 
counsel challenged the missed treatment violation, indicating 
that there had been a misunderstanding, but this disputed 
issue remained unresolved at the time when the District Court 
sentenced Paladino.  Adams counsels against unresolved fact 
disputes and arguments—particularly those to which a 
defendant might speak.  Furthermore, had Paladino exercised 
the right of allocution, he might have anticipated that the 
District Court could impose supervised release conditions and 
might have spoken so as to influence that sentencing decision.  
Here, the District Court, at the behest of the Government, 
issued the original and modified conditions imposed upon 
Paladino for his prior child pornography conviction, without 
any personal solicitation of Paladino’s statements relating to 
these sentencing decisions. 
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at 251 (quoting Adams, 252 F.3d at 288).  As such, this is an 
appropriate case in which to grant relief. 
 Thus, we conclude that the District Court committed 
plain error in denying Paladino’s right of allocution at his 
revocation hearing, and we will therefore remand this case for 
resentencing on this ground.  As for Paladino’s second 
argument regarding the constitutionality of a particular 
condition of supervised release, our “resentencing remedy . . . 
obviates the need to decide that issue.”  Adams, 252 F.3d at 
277.6   
V. 
 In accordance with the foregoing, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order, entered on August 20, 2013, and 
remand for resentencing. 
                                              
6 Here, the District Court set forth no reasons for its 
imposition of the condition challenged in this appeal (nor did 
it set forth any reasons for any of the other conditions it 
imposed at the revocation hearing).  “While the district court 
has broad discretion in fashioning conditions of supervised 
release,” when resentencing Paladino we advise the District 
Court to “state the reasons in open court for imposing [its] 
particular sentence.”  United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 371 
(3d Cir. 1999).    
